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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to determine whether democratization should be utilized as a method
of peacekeeping. This is determined by studying both the United States and the European
Union’s efforts to spread democracy globally. The historic framework is studied to understand
the unique perspective each body has formed in defining democracy, and the method through
which it should be spread. The definition of power, democracy, and the state are studied. The
concepts are applied to the case studies of Iraq and Turkey in order to make a determination.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of democracy is one that has borne witness to its inherent
inconsistencies: in a purely theoretical state, it has been the source of profound promise to
alleviate the ills plaguing a political society; in reality though, democracies were more apt to
have turbulent and brief lives. It is a wonder then that this ideology found such a prominent
position within the framework of the foreign policy agendas of two of the most influential global
players: the United States and the European Union.
The rise of the popularity of this political ideology can be found in the years following
the end of World War II. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
anticipation that the twentieth century would usher in a democratic peace emanated. This
promise fueled a new wave of policymaking, and it arose at a time in which the conditions to
firmly establish democratic foundations were seemingly ideal. The post 1989 world saw an
erosion of the tension between the capitalist West and the communist East, and the instability
caused by the previous two wars of the century had created fertile grounds for the transition to a
less autocratic regime. The world was ready for a transformation to take place, and the European
Union and the United States recognized that a passive approach to democracy building could not
be afforded at a time of such opportune change. They welcomed this shared mission, and the
Transatlantic Agenda1 was adopted by the European Community, which predated the European
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Formalized the relationship between the European Community and the United States. Cooperation
focused on areas such as the economy, education, science and culture.

Union, and the United States, which sought to “support the rule of law, and democracy”
(Warlouzet, 2019, p. 18). This established the foundation for the New Transatlantic Agenda2,
which further promoted this goal while further seeking to “seize the opportunity presented by
Europe's historic transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies
throughout the continent” (EU). This determination has remained even as the promise of a new
peaceful world order has waned. Despite intermittent turmoil and disagreements, such as the war
in Iraq, the consensus held that the promotion of democratic ideologies remained paramount
goals of both powers.
Purpose
The challenge on a global scale thus persists of how to balance the idealism of democracy
with the realities of its failings. It is the purpose of this paper then to analyze the implementation
of democratization as a tool for the promotion of peace in foreign policy. The importance of this
study is apparent first in the magnitude in which democracy is intertwined with the foundations
of both powers. The prominence of the United States has historically been derived from the
authority obtained through the ideals of the democratic process. In regard to the European Union,
the principle of democratization is engrained within the framework of the institution by the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, and in the later revisions of 1997 and 2001. Efforts to implement
democratic systems within these countries served as the motivation behind expansion in the East,
and in the creation of regional policies as underscored by the European Neighborhood Policy.
Thus, in exploring this subject, it creates the opportunity to meet the present
concerns surrounding the policy, as well as to explore questions such as to if: democracy
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Partnership between the United States and the European Union that outlined shared goals such as (i)
promoting peace and stability, (ii) responding to global challenges, (iii) and contributing to the expansion
of world trade and closer economic relations.

promotion offer a substantial benefit to peace promotion in foreign affairs; and to what extent
does European and American worldviews impact the powers in their pursuit of democratization?

CONSTITUTIVE MEANINGS
As a thorough analysis will be given using the phrases “democracy” “power” and “state,” it is
fundamental that a comprehensive and clear definition be given to each subject. In this way, the
clarity of the argument will not be reduced by inconsistent assumptions.
Democracy:
In its most basic sense, democracy is understood to be a system in which the
people rule. It has been the etymological understanding since its origin in ancient Greece, yet in
the modern era the term can be quite misleading. For example, before the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, Eastern Germany was technically a democracy. It even had a constitution which
guaranteed similar principles entombed in that of the United States’, including equality under the
law, freedom to assemble, and free speech. However, it was a regime ruled by corruption and
despotism, something quite unlike what the EU and US envision. It is thus necessary to give
some clarification as to the characters of a true democratic regime.
This can first be addressed by appealing to the theories of Jean Grugel, who argues that
the meaning can be derived in the space that exists between minimalist and nominal
interpretations. In light of the first stance, democracy can be seen as a “procedures and
institutions, a set of rules, [in order to] process conflict” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, p. 67) It is

these rules that allow the conflicting interests of social agents to not interfere with the harmony
of these parties. In light of the second stance however, this ideology is a way of monitoring
power dynamics between individuals in order to maximize their opportunities and influence
within the societies that they live in. In this context, democracy and citizenship are inherently
bonded together, where one informs on the identity of the other. The arrangement with the
highest efficiency is one in which all participants of the collective essentially maintain equally
the right to make decisions directly, an arrangement that recognizes the “greatest conceivable
degree [of the] the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise” (Beetham, 199, p.
130).
Here it is significant to note the distinction between the two interpretations is tied more to
the nuance of the language rather than specific content. In terms of the minimalist interpretation,
the concern lies with the process in which conflict is institutionalized, while the nominal
approach is focused on the principles underlying democracy, such as governing with popular
consent and accountability. This distinction is important when taking into account the two
methods that can be utilized to expand on the definition of democracy: evaluating it through an
empirical approach.
An originator of the empirical approach is Robert Dahl, who focused his study of
democracy on the institutions that guided its function. He introduced the idea of the polyarchy as
a description of such governance, which is characterized as an arrangement where the social
interests of competing and differing parties are guaranteed representation. The foundation of this
system is a concurrence on an established standard of rules, the scope of policy, and the confines
of political activity. From here are the fundamental institutions such as inclusive suffrage, access

to fair elections of government officials, and the right to run for public office. For Dahl, these
mechanisms allow for the natural corruptibility of humanity to be tamed. As he highlighted,
“Human desires are insatiable, but reason dictates prudence. With the aid of reason,
people can discover the general rules or precepts that will enable them to improve their
chances of gaining the ends their passions dictate. All people, then, seek power in order
to satisfy their passions. But reasons tell them how to seek power to reduce frustration,
defeat, and the chances of violent death.” (1984, p. 51).
Joseph Schumpeter adopts a similar stance in regard to democracy as Dahl does, yet his
views are more pessimistic. While Dahl saw the idealized promise of democracy to establish
rationality, Schumpeter instead saw it as a necessary check on the inadequacy of man to rule. Far
from the glorified personification of classical antiquity, which “attributed to the electorate an
altogether unrealistic degree of initiative…,” democracy is only a means through which
individuals have the opportunity to refuse or accept the people that rule them. When dealing with
the complexities of statecraft, people are generally unfit to rule, and as such democracy provides
the mechanism to coordinate competition for leadership. Thus, it is imperative to have a system
in which the arrangements that allow for competition between the elite decision makers are
safeguarded, and which promotes a culture of compromise and tolerance (Schumpeter, 1975, p.
271).
An ideological perspective parallels the views expressed by the empirical persuasion, yet
it differs fundamentally in one regard. Not only is it a system in which the competing interests of
powerful elites are reconciled, it is the only feasible government system and can be applied
universally. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama draws on the events of the Cold War and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union to expound on this theory, stating that “humanity had reached not

just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that
is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government” (1989, p. 4). Drawing on the ideologies of
Karl Marx and Georg Wilhelm, he proposed that all of human history was a linear progression
which eventually culminated in the enactment of an ideal political order. Communism was
democracy’s greatest rival, and with the exhaustion of systematic alternatives came the
realization that it was the only viable conclusion to history's struggles.
This argument was further favored by the proponents of democratic peace theory, which
argues that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with each other (Mello,
2014). This is in part because elected officials are held accountable to a large electorate under the
institutions of this political system, and as such combat is an unappealing option for citizens and
the government. This view does not rely on the assumption that the elected officials and civilians
are liberal-minded, but rather that the democratic structure will ensure that citizens have enough
leverage over the authority of the government to ensure those in power will be less likely to
approve a war. The institutions such as competitive elections and freedom of speech thus serve to
provide incentive for incumbent leaders to abstain from bloodshed. This theory faces some
criticism from those who cite that it conflates causation with correlation, yet further studies by J.
David Singer, Melvin Small, and Michael W. Doyle points to that some form of democratic
peace can be found in these societies despite marginal exceptions (Simpson, 2019).
Democracy to Democratization
The meaning of democracy has been analyzed through empirical, ideological, and
minimal and nominal methods. A similar process is necessary now to derive its relation to
democratization. Much as democracy was difficult to concisely define, so too was the

complexity of the variety of literature surrounding the transformative power of democratization.
Its most incremental formula is purely understood as the process of directing a political system to
a government which is representative and accountable. However, despite the promise of
democracy and the hopefulness of its proponents, why is it that some transformed democracies
disintegrate rather than flourish?
One response to this is Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave, in which he analyzes the
process of democratization in the developing world that occurred during the same period and
which transitioned in opposite directions. He theorizes there are three waves, the first of which
occurred at the start of the nineteenth century and continued to the nineteen-thirties in America.
It was closely tied with the spread of capitalism and the rise of global markets, but it quickly
crumbled into authoritarian rule, and further challenged the growth of liberal democracy in
communist and fascist countries. The second wave-democratization occurred largely through
“foreign imposition and decolonization” (Huntington, 1993, p. 583). It was instigated by the end
of the Second World War and the defeat of the axis powers, and was applied to Japan, certain
parts of Latin America, and Western Europe. The third wave was characterized by uprisings
which overthrew repressive dictatorships in Romania, the Philippines, and Portugal in the 1980s.
This last instance shared common threads throughout the societies: the growth of global
communication links, poor economic performance, the development of the European Union, and
the preponderance of communication links globally.
Analyzing these trends reveals a parallel to the work of Anthony Gibbons, in which he
argues modernity is a global trend which is capable of producing a universal culture. Modernity
and economic progress are often associated with one another. The spread of capitalism as an
economic system led to the rise of increased industrialization and mass consumption, supporting

a rising middle class whose increased wealth led them to demanding greater political
participation. This highlights the appeal of democracy as a means to transform the state in order
to reconcile class conflict. The basic assumptions of historical sociology coincide with this
evaluation of social cohesion, yet it delineates from modernism's interpretation of this in
universal terms. It instead argues that the push for democratization is unique to each case and
must be analyzed as such. The consequence of this is the promotion of the importance of agency
in establishing this government system, wherein rational motivated actors make conscientious
choices to construct a liberal regime. Therefore, pursuing democracy is an appealing and feasible
initiative (Giddons, 2013).
Whatever the circumstances that induce aspirations for democratic transformations, it is
an unfortunate consequence that a significant number of new democracies descend into
militaristic authoritarian regimes. The reason for this can in part be due to the manner in which
power is conferred in the democratization process. Suppressive regimes such as dictatorships
often rely on a large military apparatus, which are largely integrated within the higher echelons
of the government elite. Furthermore, their institutional role was more permanent than that of a
specific regime: you may depose a political system and instigate a new one, but it will always
require a military force to assure its stability. Therefore, military leaders would often initiate the
termination of their government, often negotiating with opposition forces and civilians to codify
their withdrawal. However, they habitually ensure their foothold in this reconstructed society by
ensuring “exit guarantees” for their surrender. According to Demetrios Caraley:
First, there would be no prosecution, punish- ment, or other retaliation against military
officers for any acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the
institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment would be respected,

including its overall responsibility for national security, its leadership of the government
ministries concerned with security, and often its control of arms industries and other economic enterprises traditionally under military aegis” (2004, p. 585).
The military would thus be capable of resuming their professional role within the new world
order, and then recapture power when their interests arose. This transplantation through
transformation has characterized the transitions of several systems through the three waves of
democratization.
Despite the academic tradition used to analyze democracy and democratization, they each
address a shared set of interests. First, they all acknowledge the critical role that elites have in
affecting the manner in which transitions develop. Second, each one recognizes the role of
institutional structures such as representative government, as well as the importance of the
process of elections, to highlight their ability to suppress social discord. Third, each school of
thought assimilates the approach to democracy in an international sphere. Finally, fourth, full
comprehension of these ideologies requires an analysis of the relationship between power and
the state, which is carried out in the latter two sections.
Power
Power is essentially the mechanism through which a state garners authority to exert
influence. A prevalent theme throughout the discussion of democracy is the manner in which it is
capable of constraining the rivalries between contending forces in order to ensure they are less
likely to exert violence on a global level. Since conflict is a battle to garner power, a thorough
analysis of this concept is necessary in order to understand how it meaningfully impacts the
installation and persistence of a democratic system.

Numerous schools of thought have been established to identify the key characteristics of
power, especially in its relation to the perpetuation of democracy. One traditional school of
thought is presented by Steven Lukes, wherein he argues that power is exerted in three ways:
non-decision-making power, ideological power, and decision-making power. Decision-making
power relates to the manner in which “power is a behavioral attribute that applies to individuals
to the extent that they are able to modify the behavior of other individuals within a decisionmaking process” (1974, p. 18). Thus, a person who has the most power in a certain situation is
the person who succeeds in the decision-making process. As Lukes states:
“Thus, I conclude that this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict
of (subjective) interests, seen as expressing policy preferences, revealed by political
participation. (1974, p. 19)”
This first school of thought relies on the strength of military superiority and can be only tested in
the context in situations of physical conflict. In this more traditional conceptualization of
interstate relations, the ability to wage warfare is the greatest indicator of status. Thus, power is
interwoven with military strength. In this sense, the capabilities of the United States exceeds that
of the European Union. In 2009, for example, the United States military budget was more than
the next fourteen countries put together (Horowitz, p. 57).
The second dimension of power extends the conceptualization of the first, encapsulating
that individuals can exert power through forming the agenda of issues presenting to the
population. As such, the individuals who succeed in garnering power do not exert decision
making on existing ideologies, but levy authority over the creation of those ideologies. As
highlighted by The Two Faces of Power, “to the extent that a person or group -- consciously or

unconsciously -- creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person
or group has power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 951). The use of ideologies then is a
fundamental aspect of control. The two-dimensional theory of power repositions the importance
of conflict to that of consent. The perception of power is one in which authority is derived from
its connection to a common objective. As Talcott Parsons underscores power is the “general
capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations in a system of collective
organization… [which are] legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals” (1949,
p. 171). Therefore, the statement that someone is in power really implies that someone has been
empowered by a group.
This capacity requires less focus on military strength, and attention devoted to influence
and persuasion. In comparison to the United States, the European Union is a more formidable
force. The principle of acquis communautaire highlights this, wherein European nations that
wish to join the union must conform to the unified policies ranging from market regulation to
education. In return, these countries are then entitled to regional funding, and garner influence
over security and trade policies. In this manner, the European Union is able to expand its
domination by assimilating other countries into a homogenous set of standards.
The defining features of these two goals can be restructured into the distinctions of “soft”
and “hard” powers. While the latter relies on capability to garner military strength, the former
instead is instead “associated with intangible power resources, such as culture, ideology, and
institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 166). Soft powers also reflect Arnold Wolfer’s theory of “milieu
goals” as a direction of diplomatic relations. Nations who pursue these goals “are out not to
defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others,” but instead “aim instead at
shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries” (1962, p. 73). As he highlights, were it not

for the existence of these goals, “peace would never be the objective of national policy” as it
requires that “peace cannot be the possession of any one nation; it takes at least two to make and
have peace” (1962, p. 74). Diplomatic priorities have shifted in the years after the Cold War,
away from the exertion of hard powers to the manipulation of soft powers. The proliferation of
social media has shifted the world order in a relatively short time, providing a vehicle to disperse
ideologies and cultural revolutions. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was an example of this.
Despite this shift however, the dynamic use of hard powers should not be neglected, as “the
protective role of military force remains a relevant asset in bargaining between states” (Nye,
1990, pg. 160). Therefore, a three-dimensional view of power situated between the two would
provide the best definition of power in regard to the subject of democratization.
The third dimension is perhaps the most insidious and indirect. It involves the ability to
convince a group to willingly act against their best interests. Thus, it is the manner in which
individuals garner power by altering the attitudes of a subset of society so that they conform to
the behavior the ruling class sees fit and is most commonly implemented by reinforcing a certain
ideology or false consciousness. It is the most relevant study of power, as it takes into
consideration all the manifestations of power, whether it be situations in which conflict is absent,
covert, or overt. In a departure from competing pluralistic views of his era, Luke contends that
this is not inherently physical struggles. As he states the problem is that,
“power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict; it
follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial
point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict
from arising in the first place.” (1974, pg. 27)

As Dan Little further emphasizes, “domination can occur through explicit coercive means, but it
can also occur through unconscious mechanisms” (2010, pg. 7). This is significant in the context
of implementation of power in a democratic nation. In this approach, power can be
commandeered without the use of physical force. While corrupt authoritarian regimes may
utilize this control through violent and constrictive means, the implementation of this theory
means that democratic regimes can also assert their dominance through more harmonious
measures. The ideal then for governing powers such as the EU and the US is to install a
pervasive ideology which will engage a large subsect of the population to comply willingly: the
promise of democracy offers to do just that. Furthermore, this definition recognizes the United
States military strength, while also appreciating the ability of America to assert its own soft
power, which may in some instances compete with that of the European Union. Therefore, this
framework has the capacity to evaluate the nuances of power in relation to the EU and US.
With this theoretical framework established, it is essential then to transition to an analysis
of the definition of the state, whereby power can be synthesized. According to Gianfranco Poggi,
to understand the modern state, one must be able to fathom the manner in which power is bound
to economic, political and ideological resources. He derives inspiration from the writings of
Norberto Bobio to describe economic power as that which “avails itself of the possession of
certain goods, which are rare or held to be rare, in order to lead those not possessing them in
carrying out a certain form of labor” (Poggi, 1990, pg. 4). Political power is inherently based in
the ability to garner control over the means to legitimize the exertion of violence. In regards to
ideological power, it is derived from the ability of certain individuals who maintain authority are
able to exert influence on the attitude of the population through the dispersion of certain ideas.
Poggi argues that these factors all exist collectively together, constraining the authority of each.

In order for ideological and economic power to be achieved however, it requires an environment
which is relatively stable. It is this condition then that makes it necessary for the discussion of
the concept of “the state” in relation to its connection to “democracy” and “power.” Without the
permanence of the state, the only type of power that would arise would be that of physical
violence, which according to Peter Berger is “the ultimate and oldest means of social control”
(Poggi, 1990, pg. 5). Therefore, peacekeeping initiatives are more successfully be exerted in
contexts in which this mechanism does not exist.
The State
The institutional features of the role of the state have long been unfortunately neglected
by contemporary political and sociological theory. Progress for evaluating its theoretical
importance was made in 1918, when German sociologist Max Weber introduced the
conceptualization of the state as a “human community” which was able to “claim the monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical violence within a given territory” (1946, pg. 76). Emphasis here
is placed on the term legitimate, as while other actors may use violence, the state is the only
force that can lay claim to justifiably appropriating its use. This concept is inexplicably tied to
the development of the modern state. Under feudalism for example, no lords could lay claim to
this, as while their vassals had sworn to protect them, in truth they remained free to exert force
within their fiefdoms. The king was not excluded from this, and both he and the landed nobility
were forced to share their power with the authority of the Catholic church. Thus by
“expropriating the means of political organization and domination, including violence” the
modern state was able to establish the legitimacy of its rule (Munro, 2013, pg. 1).
The Weberian definition of the state conforms with the functioning of the European
Union, which utilizes the action of “state-building” in order to attract other countries to conform

to its ideals. Weber interprets that it was this dynamic process which gave rise to the political
domination and constitutional development that was necessary for a modern state. For Weber
“the history of politics is…basically this: on one hand, the institutionalization of the powers of
command… and on the other, the emergence of power blocs [which] transform their socially preeminent position into political prerogatives” (Dusra, 1918, pg. 82). Thus, the allure of the state
authority is utilized to promote compliance to a prescribed set of approved behavior. Though the
mechanisms to urge such acquiescence differ, the congruency between the two reveals that the
manner the European Union operates is compatible with Weber’s definition of the state.
Compliance is an essential component of Weber’s discussion, as a defining feature of the
modern state is its ability to maintain both internal and external sovereignty. While it retains
significant control over coercive power, the state would be incapable of sustaining consistent
internal sovereignty through ceaseless violence. As Michael Mann highlights:
“It is…true of the Superpowers [that]: they can impose 'friendly' regimes
and de-stabilize the unfriendly through client military elites and their own covert
paramilitary organizations, but they cannot get those regimes to conform closely
to their political dictates” (1984, pg. 200).
Thus, while a superpower may have the military feasibility to excise a regime, physical
force is not sufficient to establish long-term stability. An example of this is the Falklands War in
1982, where Great Britain successfully delegitimized the Argentine regime. Though Britain
retained the ability to replicate the punishment, it failed to establish a political future for the
Islands, and relations between the two countries were not restored until 1989. This diplomatic
miscalculation underscores that power cannot be forcefully taken; it must be “freely conferred by
[civil society] upon their states” (Mann, 1984, pg. 203). Thus, a state must rely on the retention

of legitimacy, which Weber designated in to one of three types: traditional, charismatic, and
rational-legal. Modern rule is distinguished from its predecessors by its utilization of rationallegal legitimacy, which is the right-to rule derived from leaders who are chosen through an
established set of laws. Societies in which leaders derive their power through electoral processes
are a primary illustration of this. Thus, this characterization of the state is not only compatible
with the implementation of democracy, but greatly favors its adoption. A democracy in any form
would possess these necessary components, establishing a written set of rules and a system
through which members of the polity could be elected into trusted positions of influence.
In discussing the influence wielded by those chosen to lead, attention must be once again
drawn to the concept of political power. On the assumption that at its most rudimentary form it is
physical violence, what does that entail once it is intertwined with the institutions of
government? Heinrich Popitz theorized that it initially shifts to become “depersonalized” as it
progressively connects with positions and determined functions which surpass mere individuals.
Next it is “formalized” as its enactment is undergone through the guidance of procedures and
rules. In the last stage, it is “integrated” into a broader system of order. These processes, he
argues, “stabilize and reify the power relations, creating norms and standards to steer people’s
conduct” (Popitz, 2017, p. 173). The realization of this norm-making power prompts dominance,
exemplified by the network of state domination. These networks serve a unitary purpose then on
behalf of a single entity, rather than independent power centers.
A thorough analysis of the state cannot be complete, however, without a discussion of the
core connection between the state and the subjects under its control: its territory. As Gianfroggo
Poggi highlights, the connection a territory bears to its state is composed of both hard and soft
aspects. Physical boundaries are militarily defensible and geographically distinct, but they also

encompass a shared identity based on historic and cultural influences. This national identity
establishes a shared set of understandings and assumptions which governs the interaction among
citizens. Thus, if a society is going to concede to the authority of a central power, it must be one
that is conducive to these standards.
Accountability to its citizens thus is a precondition to state power, which in a
contemporary world would be satisfied by the legitimacy derived from democratic principles. A
state is able to justify its existence through the benefit it provides to its citizens, and their
acquiescence is an affirmation of this role. According to Mann, it is this that is the very nexus of
the prevalence of the modern state. Europe in the sixteenth century was capable of employing
despotic power to execute administrative and security functions with no accountability to the
citizens, but its “success was limited and precarious” (1984, p. 210). These states tended to lose
control because they lacked the logistical capabilities to coordinate social life, which led to civil
society becoming de-territorialized and decentralized. However, as the modern state relies on
power derived through the people not over them, the state infrastructures serve to coordinate
social life. This prompts the state to form close relationships with its citizens.
The previous discussion outlined how an ideal state serves as a unifying force, yet this is
not always the standard. Analyzing various examples of systems reveals that in certain
circumstances, the state can in fact be a corrosive element. According to Ahmed Samatar, the
state in its most stable form is the integral state, wherein it accomplishes the goal of sustaining a
moral bond with its people while delivering on public goods. A developmental state is one in
which the regime implements autonomous power to mobilize the industrial sector by investing
the majority of a country’s capital, but in turn sacrificing public debate and civil liberties. The
private sector is typically rigidly restricted by a group of bureaucratic government elites who are

not elected officials, and thereby do not answer to the people. The next degeneration is the
prebendal, in which government officials believe they have a state-derived right over capital and
utilize the revenue to benefit their supporters and members of their ethnic group. Samatar
highlights the misfortune of this, as the “opportunistic methods by which groups and individuals
have marshalled support to gain or retain access to public resources [will] finally destroy the
very institution that laid the golden egg” (1992, p. 640). When this system eventually fails to
function comprehensively, a predator state emerges in which the regime fails to provide goods
that promote the welfare of its citizens and social bonds decay as a result. In its most deteriorated
form, the state becomes cadaverous, in which civic life is non-existent and political life is
characterized by brutal physical violence.
These trends occur even if a country has the resource wealth to ensure economic
sufficiency for all its citizens. Thus, it is important to recognize that despite the conditions that
shape its existence, the state is fundamentally a human invention, directly informed by the
deliberate choices of rational actors. Furthermore, the elements of a successful modern state
established above, such as democratic legitimacy, centrality, and autonomy, are under constant
threats from a shifting world order. The purpose of state building should be to create “a future
where the security and the dignity of every citizen is the principal tenet of the law of the land”
(Samatar, 1992, p. 640). This ideal though is rarely born out of pure chance, and often requires
efforts to suppress natural human inclinations towards greed and corruption.
The Network State
The most direct pressure to the elements of an idealized modern state is globalization.
According to Manuel Castells, “globalization and liberalization do not eliminate the nation-state,
but they fundamentally redefine its role and effects of its operation” (2000, p. 244). A clear

definition has often eluded consensus among scholars, as significant ideology has surrounded the
notion. However, in order to highlight how it is affecting the nature of the state, a few features
can be identified.Its origins are better understood through the lens of an economic dimension.
This trend only became feasible in the last twenty years, when breakthroughs in computer
science and engineering produced the technological infrastructure to enable economies to rely
principally on information processing. Global powers such as India, Russia, Japan, China, the
United States, and Western Europe had the highest concentration of innovative research centers,
placing them at the highest tier of technology and science in this coming age. The result was that
the power to dictate and shape further development was concentrated within their spheres.
However, while these innovations have global ramifications, the preponderance of jobs are local
and regional. Whether individuals are able to benefit from it is dependent on their direct
connection to the globalized sector through their national economy.
If this globalization continues to spread throughout the world, so that all territories and all
people are influenced by its existence, then there will be people who are not incorporated by it.
The information age has had incredible benefits for humanity, but it also serves to disenfranchise
a large subset. “It is this simultaneous capacity to include and exclude people, territories and
activities that characterizes the new global economy as constituted in the information age”
(Castells, 2000, p. 114). A similar process of disenfranchisement applies to other important
critical aspects of social culture, including science, the media, and access to information. This
polarization degrades the relationship between the social classes, perpetuating a system of
exclusion and inequality. The legitimacy of a regime is thereby threatened, as it is ability to
maintain the welfare benefits of its citizens and social cohesion is corroded.

The state needs to redefine its role in such a system, and thus an organizational
transformation is needed to accompany this technological transformation. A state alone cannot
sway the direction of global flows in financial markets, and these trends are not always dictated
to by established economic rules. Thus states have adapted to this by adopting a set of
interconnected units known as a network. In exchange for durability, some powers have
relinquished some authority and united in a system in which sovereignty is shared in the pursuit
of global governance. These systems have always existed, but in the shifting nature of this
technological age, they have become the most influential form of organization. This is because
the “strength of networks is their flexibility, their decentralizing capacity, their variable
geometry, adapting to new tasks and demands without destroying their basic organizational rules
or changing their overarching goals'' (Dagron, 2006, p. 954). The rise of the network state meant
that where once prerogatives such as defense, migration, or management of an economic policy
were unique to a country, they would now be exercised jointly through a chain of institutions.
The European Union is perhaps the greatest realization of this goal. It comprises twentyseven member states whose policies are highly integrated. In regard to migration, all member
states are able to avail themselves to open flow of movement within its borders. The judicial
system is also unified, as any decision made by the European Court of Justice and European
Court of Human Rights are mandatory for all members. In terms of economic policies, the
Maastricht treaty established a common currency to be used among the members. Furthermore,
the European Commission has the power to act on the behalf of any of the states in regard to
trade disputes where third parties are involved. There are aspects in which the Union is not
always unilaterally united. The recent dissonance over the favorability of the military action by
the United States government in Iraq is an example of this. However, the ability for such large

and distinctive powers to unite together within a stable and mutually beneficial relationship is an
admirable accomplishment.
In this shifting order, the promise of democratization as an initiative of the European
Union becomes more compelling. Regimes in which the government suppresses the population
and consolidates the majority of the wealth are unlikely to be able to adapt to this economic
reorganization. If they do, it is likely that the manner in which they do so will benefit a small
share of elites while debilitating the majority of the citizenry. The European Union has an
established framework of shared initiatives and codified rules which all members must conform
to if they wish to benefit from the network. Thus, these recovering states could share in the
promise of globalization while also obtaining the government mechanisms necessary to disperse
the revenue throughout their society. The result would be a more consolidated world order, in
which countries united in the promotion of each member.
Conclusion
I began this section by analyzing the fundamental concepts in relation to democratization,
so that an understanding of the crucial constitutive meanings integral to the enactment of these
strategic doctrines could be established. I therefore investigated the concepts of democracy,
power, and the state through various academic schools of thought to discern the nature of these
notions.
In my discussion of democracy, I analyzed interpretations that were empirical and
idealistic, and nominal and minimalist. These all highlighted the ability of democratic institutions
to harmonize the consistent competition between social groups, while others argued that it was
the only feasible form of government. In regard to democratic transition, recognition is paid to its

association with modernity and the role of the military elite is provided as an explanation as to
why these transitions sometimes fail.
Power is addressed by evaluating both its covert and overt manifestations, and discussing
the effects of authority, coercion, and influence. An essential aspect is the focus on situations in
which citizens consent to relinquish their power to centers to their government officials, so that
coercive powers are not relied on as a primary method of domination. Lastly, attention is given
to classifying the central features of the modern state, essentially centrality, organization, and
autonomy, and then the manner in which this traditional definition is affected by globalization is
highlighted. These serve to inform on the preceding discussion on the role of the European
Union and the United States on a global field.

American and European Perspectives
In the previous section a significant effort was dedicated to analyzing the relevant
theories. The goal of the proceeding section is to transition to evaluating the empirics. This will
be accomplished first through analyzing how European and American thinkers have adapted
their own conceptualization of democracy, power, and the state. In regard to the United States,
this evaluation will be focused primarily on the concept of Neoconservatism, which has striking
relevance in this arena as it is credited as informing deeply the foreign policy of the Bush
administration. It is important to note here that Neoconservatism is only one theory of many that
has informed on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. It is studied here because of its
popularity during the Bush administration. In regard to the European Union, I will utilize the
normative power Europe framework, which characterized the EU’s role in its global role. In
doing so, I will analyze how the independent documents identify how democratization can
promote these ideals and how each power determines significant threats to international security
and peace. This will establish the standards to approach an analysis of the case studies discussed
later.
Neoconservatism
Neoconservatism has experienced a recent wave of criticism, due mainly to the belief that
the Bush administration relied too heavily on its tenets. Though many academics have informed
on its incarnation, Irving Kristol is largely regarded as the founder of the movement, born from
his disenchantment with the promise of Marxism and the ineptitude of Joseph Stalin’s regime.
Surprisingly, Kristol dismisses the idea of Neoconservatism and a movement, favoring instead to
perceive it as an inclination, which “manifests itself over time… and whose meaning we only

clearly glance at in retrospect” (Kristol, 1995, p. 23). Neoconservatism is thus an organized set
of attitudes which find their origin in historical experiences.
A great focus of Kristol’s work is the manner in which a country’s behavior in relation to
foreign authorities is informed by its power. For a player like the United States, its power means
that the scope of its influence transcends national boundaries. The perception of national interests
is broad in scope, as it is deeply influenced by the ideological foundation of the country, which is
based on democratic ideals. Such perception provides justification as to why the United States
chose to partner with Great Britain and France during World War II, as well as to why it also has
perpetuated further interventionist policies in foreign nations. As Kristol highlights this principle
by stating “power breeds responsibilities, in international affairs as in domestic -- or even
private. To dodge or disclaim these responsibilities is one form of the abuse of power” (1995, p.
157). The feasibility of such endeavors is derived from the United States prevalence of hard
powers, as discussed previously in regard to Nye’s work. The military strength of the United
States is superior to other nations, a situation which arose as a consequence of the end of the
Cold War.
Europe was focused on promoting social policy, and thus redirected funds from its
military. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum was created in the global
field in which the United States arose as a singular authority. According to Kristol, this power
requires that the United State embrace its responsibility as a protectorate of democratic ideals.
This argument has defined the attitudes of the Neoconservative movement following the
cessation of the Cold War. This is highlighted within the works of Charles Krauthammer, who
proposed in his work The Lonely Superpower that the esteemed position the United States

experiences demands that it maintains world peace, with the primary motive of propagating the
adoption of democratic systems of government. As he argues,
“that the end of American foreign policy is not just the security of the United States, but
what John F. Kennedy called ‘the success of liberty.’ That means, first, defending the
community of democratic nations (the repository of the liberal idea) and second,
encouraging the establishment of new liberal policies at the frontier, most especially in
the Third World” (1986).
Krauthammer negated the prevailing theory of his contemporaries who argued that the fall of the
Soviet Union would enact a global order in which the threat of warfare would be diminished, and
the world would become multipolar. These invalid views echo Fukuyama’s argument that a
harmonious democratic system would unilaterally arise with the cessation of the Cold War, yet
they fail to acknowledge the shifting geopolitical structure of the era. In his work the Unipolar
Moment, he instead predicted that the United States would emerge as the hegemonic power over
the world whose strength would far exceed that of any other global player. Peace would not be
assured in this system as,
“International stability is never a given. It is never the norm. When achieved, it is the
product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest
power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States. If America wants
stability, it will have to create it” (1990, p. 23).
Undeniably, the United States did benefit from a military and economic superiority,
which enabled it to exert significant influence over instances of global conflict. This was
highlighted during the first war against in Iraq against Saddam Hussein, in which Krauthammer
argues that “the United Nations [could] guarantee nothing… were it not for United States leading

and prodding…nothing would have been done: no threat of force, no embargo, no Desert Storm”
(2004, p. 18).Multilateralism in this sense was illusionary only, ineffective and worse, a threat to
the U. S’s free exercise of power.
The attention given to this armed conflict underscores an element which Krauthammer
believed distinguished the new world order. Rather than seeing the proliferation of harmonious
and secure societies, the era instead became more susceptible to discord. This is a consequence
of the rise of globalization, which despite the positive innovations derived from technological
innovation, has also produced threatening repercussions. One of the most dangerous of these is
the spread of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War it would have been implausible for a state
without a large industrial sector to obtain the means to threaten the security of its neighbors, yet
within the new era backward and peripheral Middle Eastern states arose swiftly to pose sincere
threats to world security. “The divide between great powers and regional powers is radically
narrowed…missiles shrink distance [and] nuclear devices multiply power” (Youhana). If these
small autocratic regimes were capable of accumulating significant armaments, then they would
attain an unacceptable equity with the authority of the United States. These threats were
designated as “Weapon States,” in which he identified as consisting of shared characteristics; a
deep grievance against Western imperialism, which serves to motivate its military expansion; a
government apparatus that subverts and dominates the will of the people; and indefinite borders
implemented by previous colonial rulers. The necessity of suppressing such threats became a
primary concern in Krauthammer’s foreign policy initiatives.
The opposition to such forces expanded past the theories of Krauthammer however, and
was adopted by American policymakers by the 1990s, arriving at the end of the First Gulf War.
In his essay “Confronting Backlash States”, advisor Anthony Lake highlighted that Bill Clinton’s

national security priorities targeted several “outlaw states” including North Korea, Cuba, Iraq,
Iran and Libya, which would “assault [democracy’s] basic values” (2009). “For the sake of both
its interests and its ideals” argues Lake, “the United States has a special responsibility to nurture
and promote their core values” (2009).
This attitude is further reflected in the foreign policy initiatives of George W. Bush. The
terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as the armed intervention in Afghanistan brought greater
recognition to the threat of Weapon States. There was no longer a distinction among these unique
actors; instead, all combatant forces were combined as a unitary threat to the prosperity of
democracy. In his 2002 state of the Union address, President Bush promoted the fear of an “axis
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world,” implying a relationship that was nonexistent
between Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In 2003, Krauthammer reformed his theories in the
Unipolar Moment Revisited, wherein he asserted that the conflict the United States experienced
was confirmation of the Neoconservative theory. He believed that the U.S. would continue to be
plagued for the foreseeable duration by the consistent threat of rogue states. The Bush’s
administration’s policies of regime change, and continuous strikes were thus necessary to usher
in a new protective order.
The Obama administration did not maintain the same overt ardor for the initiative of
democracy building, but it similarly espoused the war on Weapon states. Deriving credence from
the echoes of Krauthammer’s vigilance, relations with Iran during the first term were marked by
the threat of military strikes and sanctions. While the rhetoric shied away from promoting a
neoconservative sentiment, the initiatives taken in regard to the Middle East revealed that its
influence was still prevalent. The preponderance of these ideals is further enumerated by the fact
that they remained a conspicuous organizational narrative for the Trump administration.

Discourse such as the discussion of a preemptive war with North Korea or claims instigated by
Mike Pompeo in regard to imposing heavy sanctions against Iran, highlights that the writings of
Krystol and Krauthammer have left a lasting imprint.
In what manner do these arguments expound on the theoretical concepts examined in the
previous section? First, the Neoconservative understanding of power is understood to be one
reliant primarily on hard factors, mainly those derived and evaluated through the context of
conflict. The ability of the state to enforce its mandates through coercive force is a guiding force
through which legitimacy is derived. As revealed by the writing of post-Cold War intellectuals,
the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in an era defined by the hegemonic authority of the United
States which required the utilization of military force to maintain a stable peace. From here, it
can be understood that power is identified through two approaches: one that is pragmatic and
another which is moral. Moral authority is not born from appeal to soft power such as social
unity or economic promotion. Instead, the imperative is born from the evaluation of the
superiority of the American military strength and the broad interpretation of the definition of
national interest. The Neoconservative approach to analyzing power places a significant
emphasis on the role of military might, but with the purpose of promoting democratic principles
and confronting rogue states which threaten the harmony of the world order.
The promotion of democracy became a major initiative after the downfall of the Soviet Regime,
yet the ideals of such a strategy had long been a pursuit of the country’s diplomatic efforts. An
increasing concern for the superpower however was an inherent paradox that required the United
States to intervene on the autonomy on foreign countries in order to promote self-government. A
significant impetus for accomplishing this task was firstly that occupying a country went against

the very principles of democratic rule, and second, whether a democracy could be maintained
whether the coercive threat of military strength was removed.
These tensions could be addressed if the United States established justifiable means to
legitimize their influence. The process of democratization must find credence in both ideological
and strategic grounds, as highlighted by Krauthammer, “to intervene solely on the basis of
democratic morality is to confuse foreign policy with philanthropy,” but “to act purely for the
reasons of strategy is corrupting and unsustainable for a democracy” (Krauthammer, 1985, pg.
10). The Cold War however ushered in a transition from these parameters, derived from the
belief that in defending democratic principles abroad, the safety of America would by extension
be secured. Furthermore, unilateral decision making was justified by the belief that there was no
alternative power who had the capability to enact this initiative, and also because while the
United States may have been immune to certain threats, smaller states were not. This required
that the United States use its coercive power to act on their behalf.
Similar principles are used to justify the same show of force in contemporary foreign
policy. It is proposed that the threat posed by the spread of communism is a comparable struggle
to that of the perpetuation of Arab-Islamic totalitarianism. The answer to this concern then takes
the form of democratic globalism, a “foreign policy that defines national interest not as power,
but as values” (Krauthammer, 2004, pg. 6). Here the Neoconservative interpretation combines
two rationales previously discussed to justify democratic peace in the previous section.
Normative justifications are based on the assumption that the ruler of a democracy will reduce
international conflict by appealing to peaceful negotiations. Institutional rationales on the other
hand argue that a democracy’s accountability to its political elites through the utilization of

checks and balances is responsible, thereby constraining corruptive behavior. Through the model
of the United States, both these actions are complementary.
Lastly, the role of the state garners prominent discussion in reference to democratic
globalization. The threat to democracy discussed in previous sections calls attention to a
discussion of regime types, which is fundamental in regard to the Neoconservative perception of
both foreign and domestic affairs. Philosopher Leo Strauss’ ideas were utilized to inform the
importance of this. He viewed regimes in a classical sense, in which the informal habits and the
formal institutions are capable of merging. Regimes thus constitute the manner in which to live a
life and shapes the human behavior of its citizenry.
Two implications can thus be derived from this analysis, the first of which is that certain
problems related to global politics could be remedied by a transformation of the regime. The
normative explanation of democratic peace supports this assertion, as it highlights that the
foreign policy of a country is the reflection of its morals of the underlying society. If a country
has a regime in which the members are treated justly, they are likely to replicate the behavior
with foreign nations. Second, the initiatives to modify the authoritarian regime is likely to be less
effective than transforming the nature of the system itself.
Normative Power Europe
Unlike the United States, the European Union does not have cohesive guiding political
ideology which explicitly designates democratization as a moral obligation. Indeed, since the
onset of European integration, implicit reference to democracy promotion has often been
concealed under the guise of broad human rights policy. Thus while it is widely accepted that the
premise of assimilation in to the EU is derived from the basis that member states are to be
consolidated democracies guided by the rule of law, “little reference to these allegedly

constitutive norms can be found in the founding treaties” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2018, p. 16).
However, “the lack of references to these norms in the founding documents should not be
understood as a complete absence of a focus on human rights and democratic developments in
the early stages of European integration” but rather “as a testimony to both the scope of
European integration and the context within which this took place (Holzhacker and Neuman,
2018, p.17).
As was the case with the United States, the Cold War marked a transformative period in
the development of the European Union as a driving external force of democratization. The two
bodies which constitute the origins of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
and the European Economic Community (EEC), determined assimilation on a primarily
economic basis. The rights of a citizen were established pertaining to their relation European
market, such as a business owner or a worker (Smith, 2003). The promotion of a unifying human
rights policy was seen as unnecessary in relation to this goal, and such efforts were instead
entrusted to other international bodies such as the Counsel of Europe. It was not until the
Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity in 1973 that the profile of both democracy and
human rights was elevated to explicitly become the principles upon which a common identity
would be established. They asserted that “determined to defend the principles of representative
democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress
– and of respect for human rights” (European Communities 1973, p. 1). However, while the
member states “specified which underlying values would inform its internal identity,” they did
not create “an outward-geared human rights and/or democratization policy” (Holzhacker and
Neuman, 2018, p. 17). Without this dimension, the member states were unable to take on an
active role in bringing about a democratic transformation.

The onset of the Cold War altered the manner in which the European community viewed
its position within world politics. After fifty-years at the epicenter of a bi-polar world order, the
member states found themselves conferred upon by a multitude of challenges that threatened
their position in the international system. The answer to this was the signing of the Treaty of the
European Union in 1992, which bound its members “to common policies over issues including
humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, in addition to other policies such as trade and cooperation
agreements, conflict prevention and economic sanctions, to the point where it is the only genuine
supranational power in world politics (Smith, 2005, pg. 171).” The establishment of EU
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) meant that discourse around the organization
centered on its role as a distinct institution, rather than analyzing it on an individual state level.
It was in this context that Ian Manners developed the Normative Power Europe
Framework (NPE) and profoundly impacted European integration scholarship. He argued that
this conceptualization was based in “power over opinion… and the desire to move beyond the
debate over state-like features through and understanding of the EU’s identity; effectively a
series of principles and shared beliefs that the member states adhere to and set an example with”
(Manners, 2002, p.239; Hardwick, 2011,p. 2). Manners contended that this does not undermine
the civilian or military power which the organization possesses, but rather draws attention to the
ideological impact that the EU exerts on a global scale. Indeed, he expanded on the ideas of
Johan Gultung, who argued that there is a distinction between the channels of power, (punitive
power), and and the sources of power (structural power), a differentiation which is significant as
“it is on the latter that the European Community is particularly strong, even more so than the
United States (Galtung, 1973, p. 36). Normative power is thus not distinguished by its reliance
on military might, but rather on the ability to exert influence through opinions and ideas. Power

emanates from the capacity to establish what is “normal in world politics,” which is willingly
accepted and adopted. The idea of a normative power Europe was unique because it centered
analysis on “cognitive processes” , both “substantive and symbolic components,” rather than
“empirical emphasis on EU institutions or policies” (Manners, 2002, pg. 239).
The norms which constitute the EU’s international identity have developed throughout
the years through a series of treaties, declarations, policies and conditions, and then cemented in
the EU’s body of law, the acquis communitaire. The five core norms which serve a basis of the
normative character are: “peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human
rights. This is further supported by four minor norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination,
sustainable development, and good governance” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 14). The
establishment of these standards provides the basis through which the EU derives its legitimacy
as a regulatory power. Indeed, the implications of this reconceptualization meant that:
“the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it-that the EU can be
conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system... that the EU acts to change
norms in the international system; and that the EU should act to extend its norms into the
international system” (Manners, 2002, p. 252).
This imperative was a function of the post-Cold War years, where social solidarity
served as an important counter measure to the Communist threat. In the era following, memberstates reassessed their role within a global context and the idea of democracy promotion abroad
garnered greater prominence. The organization has taken further steps to produce an external
policy conditioned by these norms, which has aligned it more with the universal declaration of
human rights and (UDHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) than “most other actors in world politics” (Manners, 2002, p. 241). It has

further cemented its commitment to such actions through Article 21 of the Treaty on the
European Union, which states:
“The Union's performance on the international scene shall be guided by the principles
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to
improve in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law
(Treaty on European Union, 2008).”
In order to be a normative power, “a state must not only seek normative objectives when
pursuing a foreign policy, but it must also achieve its goals through normative instruments such
as economic and diplomatic means” rather than coercive measures (Tocci, 2008, pg. 8). The EU
has thus relied on the mechanism of norm diffusion in order to disperse these standards on a
global level. The approach taken is dependent on the country and region, and can be delineated
into four categories: “(i) direct EU democracy policies, programs, and instruments; (ii) indirect
support through economic development and support for good governance; (iii) a coordinating
approach at international and regional bodies; and (iv) a multilevel governance approach with the
member states.” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 24). The first approach relies on the
mechanisms of procedural and informational diffusion in order to support the building of
democratic institutions and an active civil society. The second approach is indirect, and focuses
on promoting economic development and the advancement of a liberal middle class, which in
turn would be supportive of democratization efforts.
The third approach “broadens the EU’s impact by adding to its institutional strength”
(Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 25). These bodies include the United Nations (UN), the

Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other such regional organizations. In
these cases, the information diffusion of norms is intensified and amplified among the countries
with which the EU regularly interacts, and at the same time, the norms are also spread more
widely to countries that typically have less interaction with the EU. The final dimension of the
EU’s contemporary democratization approach is focused on the EU’s multilevel governance
approach, the activities of individual member states abroad, the development of CFSP, and the
creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whether through EEAS declarations
and statements (information diffusion), the institutionalization of relations between third
countries and individual EU member states (procedural diffusion), the establishment of EU
delegations and offices around the world by the EEAS (overt diffusion), or the provision of aid
and assistance by EU member states in third countries (transference), the EU is actively making
use of its twenty-eight member states as additional venues to promote democracy abroad
(Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019; Manners, 2002).
Of all the methods utilized by the EU to spread its normative principles, none have been
as significant as the enlargement policies. It requires that countries who wish to accede to the EU
must meet a list of criteria, and thus falls within the purview of the first method of norm
diffusion. Within these criteria, the EU embedded more updated ideas of good governance; while
not explicitly stating them, the EU reflected them through the addition of positive conditionality
and assistance aimed at achieving administrative reform. In order to become a member,
candidates must accept the European laws and comply with the Copenhagen Criteria regarding
guaranteeing democratic norms and institutional stability (Council of the EU, 1993). As a result,
the political requirements have had a definite impact on the candidate countries as the

fundamental liberal principle of legitimate statehood constitutes the most significant prerequisite
to entry into the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2006, p. 213).
In the context of the theoretical concepts discussed above, the European Union notably
deviates from that of the United States. First, the basis of NPE is that power is not derived from
military force, but rather on the use of non-coercive means. Its legitimacy is not born from the
use of physical force, but rather its role as promoter of principles. It involves persuasion,
argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame as a socializing force in terms of the
impact of the actions taken to promote such principles (Manners, 2011). As with the United
States, a moral imperative underlies the rationale behind its actions. As underscored by the
President of the EU commission, Jose Manuel Barrosa, the EU is “one of the most important, if
not the most important, normative powers in the world… it is in fact the EU which sets the
standards for others much of the time” (Bickerton, 2011, g. 28). Yet its advocacy for the
promotion of sustainable peace and effective multilateralism is a marked departure from the
United State’s unilateral approach to foreign policy.

Case Studies
Iraq
As discussed in previous sections, American foreign policy has been colored by the
determination that it carried the burden of enacting democratic ideals throughout the world. This
moral imperative was born from the threat of the Cold War, and gave rise to democratic
installations in both Japan and Germany. In the decades following this period, the rise of nuclear
power meant that Middle Eastern autocracies transplanted communist nations as the greatest
perceived threat to world security. Beginning in the 1990s, the United States refocused its
foreign policy agenda to prioritize this region, highlighted by President George W. Bush’s
assertion that the Middle East “must be the focus of American policy for decades to come”
(Bush, 2003). Central to this goal was the “the establishment of a free Iraq” which would serve
as “a watershed event in the global democratic revolution” (Bush, 2003) Prior to 9/11 however,
the United States approach was one that could be best described as hesitant and subdued. Indeed,
a year after the attacks, Richard Haas, publicly acknowledged that the U.S.’s policy toward the
Middle East had been operating in default mode (Haas 2002). When necessary, sanctions and

military strength were utilized to inhibit actions taken by the Hussein regime, and The Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998 dedicated $95 million to democratic opposition organizations. Despite
this however, both George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton were unabashed in admitting that the
primary motivation was the protection of American interests in the wider Arab world.
The 9/11 terrorist attack on the twin towers marked a significant shift in American
foreign policy. It provided the final incentive and justification to the United States government to
adopt a more determined stance in the Arab world. In 2003, the United States and coalition
forces launched a formal invasion into Iraq, setting into motion a war that would last years and
instigated significant change within the political landscape of the Middle East.
From the beginning, efforts in democracy promotion were clearly aimed to promote
Western Style democracy and the values that underpinned it. According to academics Jeff
Bridous and Milja Kurki, the term “democracy assistance” was developed to describe an
ensemble of techniques utilized by the United States to implement democracy support programs
that included “programming, sourcing of partners, technical support of target governments and
NGOs” (Taqi, 2015, p.24). These NGOs, based both in the United states and within the target
country, were chosen through a sophisticated procurement system. Funding was based around
the organization's ability to pass assessments based on progress in four pillars: elections and
political processes, civil society, rule of law, and governance. Thus, when the administration
spoke about “democracy support” throughout the Arab world, it had a clear understanding of the
form it wanted it to take. Therefore the U.S. strategy could be more accurately defined as “a
direct attempt to export political [and economic] institutions that comprise the American liberal
democratic system” (Taqi, 2015, p. 30). This is indeed reflected within then President Bush’s
declarations regarding the invasion of Iraq, implying that since the standardized Western version

worked within the United States, it would be successful within the Middle East, therefore
remedying the region’s instability.
The Bush’s administration’s prioritization of peacebuilding through democratization was
indicative of traditional neoconservative thinking, so much so that his foreign policy became
synonymous with the school of thought. When speaking with the Weekly Standard in 2007, his
Vice President Dick Cheney stated that:
“I am a big democracy advocate. And I say that for a couple of reasons. Because on the
one hand I think we have an obligation, we Americans, if we go in and take down a
government to do the best we can to stand up a new one in its place that meets the
standards and principles that we believe in.......Political reform is part of that.......”(Hayes
2007, p.474)
As highlighted by the teachings of Irving Kristol, the scope of America’s power meant that its
influence transcended national boundaries. “Power breeds responsibilities” he claimed, and the
United States military and economic strength meant “to dodge or disclaim these responsibilities
is [an] abuse of power” (Kristol, 1995, p. 157). Furthermore, when discussing the motivation
behind the regime transition, the Bush administration often interchanged the antithetical concepts
of “freedom” and “democracy” with one another. In espousing these notions Bush and his
officials utilized an understanding of power derived from a moral authority central to
neoconservative thinking. Indeed, the fundamental distinctions between the two concepts were
disregarded, moved aside to prescribe to a seemingly obvious perspective that where there is
democracy, citizens of a country will be able to exercise their inalienable rights. In his memoir,
Decision Points, Bush reiterated a statement made during his Second Inaugural Address, that
“America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one” (Bush, 2010, pg. 396).

This idealism had the unmistakable imprint of democratic peace theory, the belief that
“Democracies are inherently more friendly to the United States, less belligerent to their
neighbours, and generally more inclined to peace” (Krauthammer, 2004, pg. 11). It was a theory
that had certainly been relevant in the democratization campaigns following World War II, when
the United States had adopted its self-appointed mantle as world-peacekeeper. Both Germany
and Japan were able to make the transition from Axis-power to peaceful democracies through the
explicit assistance of American military force and these transitions set a standard of post-conflict
nation-building that has not since been matched” (cited in Dobbins et al, 2003pg.13). The
creation of these allies played a large role in Bush’s justification for invasion, as he cited in
Decision Points:
“I had studied the histories of post-war Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Each had
required many years – and a U.S. troop presence – to complete the transition from
devastation of war to stable democracies .............With time and steadfast American
support, I had confidence that democracy in Iraq would succeed” (Bush, 2010, pg. 357).
The United States was faced with a similar challenge as it had been when threatened by
decades prior, and to ignore such a call to arms would have been a betrayal to the ideals the
country was founded on.
Thus when the United States and coalition forces began their invasion, two objectives
were formally stated, the first was to find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and the second
was to bring democracy to the Iraqi populace. While the former was never found, the promise of
the latter remains unfilled. At the time of the invasion, numerous scholars expressed pessimism
at the possibility of democracy ever coming to fruition, citing that the country lacked the proper
prerequisites necessary for establishing a stable system. These critics argue that efforts to export

democracy are likely to fail because “external factors” such as military intervention “are
secondary to internal ones” (Stradioto, 2003, p. 4). These internal factors include historical,
cultural, socio-economic, and political factors which help form the forces that are responsible for
the development and stabilization of democratic structures. Since its formal independence in
1932, the country has progressed from one form of dictatorship to another, “with personalization
rather than institutionalization of politics determining the mode of change and development” (p.
177). Any change in the regime has thus been derived as a result of violence, and as such the
manner of which Iraq has evolved as a state has thus arisen through suppression. A number of
factors have contributed to this situation, and their interactions have impeded efforts of liberal
reform.
The first of which is the national identity and demographic profile of Iraq. According to
Max Weber’s theory, the state serves as a “human community” through which the allure of the
state authority is used to promote compliance to a prescribed set of approved behavior. However,
“ethnic and sectarian divisions have frequently posed a serious threat to the country’s territorial
integrity and its claim to nation state-statehood” (p. 177). Located mainly in the north of the
country is a large Kurdish Sunni minority which have consistently sought autonomy through
revolt, either in their own interests or in affiliation with their allies in Turkey and Iran. In
addition to this, the Sunni’s comprise the majority of the ruling elite, despite the fact that Shi’ites
compose a larger percentage of the population. The Sunni’s dominion has been aided through the
support of other Arab nations, as the Shi’ites in Iraq are viewed as the allies of Shi’ite Iran.
The second factor is derived from issues associated with the implementation of the
historical entity of Iraq. After the fall of the Abbasid dynasty in 1258, Iraq largely ceased to exist
as an identifiable political unit. Up until World War II it was relegated as an imperial province

by the Ottoman Empire. After the war a British mandate reshaped it into a political unit once
again, but according to historians this was done without much consideration to the country’s
persistent viability. Great Britain followed a pattern which it had enacted throughout the Middle
East, and did little to encourage the development of democratic values within Iraq. The country
was dominated by pro-British absolute monarchical rule until 1958, when an Arab nationalist
group revolted and established an Arab republic. Iraqi politics were transformed, but this radical
breakthrough brought various militant sections of the society into conflict, instigating decades of
coups and bloodshed.
A third factor was that following the heightening of the Cold War, Iraq was surrounded
by powerful rival countries whose cross-border affiliations predisposed them to anti-Iraqi
sentiment. The hostilities between Iran and Iraq were historic and rooted in concerns over
territorial boundaries and internal security. In the years preceding the Ba’ath takeover, the United
States-backed Iran sought to undermine the regime by exploiting the tensions between the ruling
elite and the Shi’ites, notably in the Kurdish population. Additionally, the pro-west Turkey
increasingly began to view Iraq as the blossoming center of Arab radicalism and further sought
to heighten discord within the Kurdish population by providing aid, in part to neutralize “their
possible support for the Kurds in Turkey in their bid to independence” (178). Syria, Iraq’s most
important neighbor, also had vested interest in the destabilization of the government, as the
ideological rift between the two nations continued to grow.
These shifting international and national circumstances created the ideal environment for
the small socialist Ba’ath Party, and by extension Saddam Hussein, to seize power in July 1968.
By manipulating the volatile internal and external relations within the country, combined with
the use of expansive violence as a means of governance, Hussein was able to establish a unique

personal dictatorship. Although for the first ten years Sadam held the position of vice president,
his position as the authority of the regime was explicit from the beginning. The socialist
philosophy of the Ba’ath party was of little relevance to Hussein, who utilized this ideological
framework to grant his personal ambitions legitimacy. His bureaucratic system siphoned
resources from the oil-rich country to benefit the Sunni Iraqis that dominated his party, as well as
his Taqridi clan and members of his own family. According to Samatar’s analysis of the erosion
of the state, Iraq in this era was defined as prebendal, and as he highlights, the misfortune of this
is that the “opportunistic methods by which groups and individuals have marshalled support to
gain or retain access to public resources [will] finally destroy the very institution that laid the
golden egg” (1995, p. 640). Under Saddam Hussein’s leadership, Iraq was characterized by low
levels of civil society autonomy, rule of law, and political autonomy, all of which posed serious
boundaries on the establishment of a democratic system.
Structuralist and strategic choice explanations argue that domestic conditions are primary
in bringing about such a transformation, but the lack of these prerequisites does not necessarily
imply that the failure of democracy is a foregone conclusion. According to Samuel Huntington’s
The Third Wave, the process of democracy in developing worlds can be codified as following
three steps: in the first stage an authoritarian regime must be removed, followed by the
installation of a new regime, and finally the consolidation, or long-term sustainability of a
democratic regime. In Iraq, where the internal prerequisites have failed to bring about regime
change, “foreign intervention is an important causal factor contributing to the removal of an
authoritarian regime and the installation of a democratic regime” (Stradiato, 2003, p. 4). In this
scenario, the prospects of democratizing Iraq were directly tied to the success of the United
State’s military in overthrowing the target regime.

This is where the significance of the United States power becomes essential in
understanding the dynamics of this regime shift. As Steven Lukes discussed, in situations in
which physical conflict are dominant, the ability to wage warfare is the greatest indicator of
status. Power is thus interwoven with military strength, and the capabilities of the United States
military allow it to establish “decision-making power.” These hard powers enabled the United
States to possess the necessary authority, even if only temporarily, “to modify the behavior of
other individuals within a decision-making process” (Lukes, 1974, p.18). Iraq had suffered a
government which brutalized its people and was the foremost agitator of both economic and
social problems, and thus the process of democratization was not an easy task. Yet by removing
the former regime, the United States military had removed the greatest impediment.
Whatever impediments that inhibit aspirations for democratic transformations, it is an
unfortunate circumstance that a significant number of new democracies descend into militaristic
authoritarian rule. The reason for this can in part be due to the manner in which power is
conferred in the democratization process. Suppressive regimes such as dictatorships often rely on
a large military apparatus, which are largely integrated within the higher echelons of the
government elite. When it is anticipated that a regime has reached the last vestiges of its rule, the
military elite within this system often begin the termination stage of their own government. This
in turn has been used as leverage in order to establish exit guarantees, granting them a foothold
in the new system so that they could resume their professional roles once the transformation was
complete.
In Iraq however, the transformation of power was accomplished with the express purpose
of removing all members of the elite from authority. In discussing regime transition, Munck and
Leff describe this type as “reform through rupture” in which transitions are dictated by the

opposition with little or no control from the incumbent elite, who are too weak to control the
process. The conclusion they derive is that this appears to “be the most unproblematic type of
transition” as it facilitates a clear departure from the past. Furthermore, Authoritarian leaders
who suffer defeat through these means often suffer through a similar fate, whether it be exile,
imprisonment, execution. A further analysis is that of Share and Mainwaring, who describe
dissolutions of regimes in which authoritarian elites have no influence over the transition in to
more liberal regimes as collapse. The end result of such defeats results in the previous regime
“being thoroughly discredited and delegitimized” (Stradiatto, 2004, p.7). The democratization
process occurs with minimal or no input from the prior ruling elites and are often the least
problematic, as highlighted by the successful transitions of Italy, Japan, and Germany. In
analyzing the circumstances surrounding Iraq, these conditions were inherently apparent. The
displacement of the ruling elite meant that they were no longer in the position to enter
themselves as candidates within elections. The Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein had largely
been eradicated, and in accordance with Munck and Leff’s theory on rupture, most of the highranking military officers were in custody or executed. Those who remained loyal to regime were
tracked, and while many possessed the capability to carry out sniper shootings and suicide
bombings, their scare tactics were insignificant in exerting influence over the new government.
Thus, the new regime was situated in a position in which its new government institution and
founding documents could be free from the influence of its authoritarian predecessors.
Thus, while the development of democracy cannot be explained by any one single factor
fully, the deposition of the incumbent government apparatus removed the most significant
impediment to its implementation. In this light, U.S intervention was a necessary condition to
instigate regime change. Indeed, assistance from the United States is important during the

transitional phase, “by establishing democratic institutions, aiding in constitution drafting, and
establishing an effective government framework” (Stradiatto, 2004, p. 5). However, intervention
alone is insufficient to guarantee consolidation. While military strength had been capable of
removing one totalitarian regime, sustainable democracy was a complex process that required the
interplay of several factors.
The promise of a democratic transformation was never accomplished within Iraq, and the
country never became the bastion of liberal idealism that the U.S. had hoped to develop in the
Middle East. While the climate of the country certainly played a role, the conflicting policy
initiatives and bureaucratic infighting within U.S. agencies in the consolidation stage impeded
the coordination of a stable democracy within Iraq. As competing and conflicting agendas
clashed, development initiative and political decision-making failed to be sufficiently
coordinating, resulting in the derailment of Bush’s neoconservative agenda.
Post-War Planning
The Neo-Conservative approach draws its authority from its appeal to hard powers. It is
born and thrives in the context of physical conflict, where the display of military prowess
establishes the manner through which ultimate authority is derived. Indeed, the strength of
American forces successfully overthrew the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, and snuffed
out the ruling elites which could have quickly supplanted him. However, once this impediment
was removed the United States needed to address the manner in which a new government would
be formed. On April 9th, 2002, the post-war planning began in the State Department’s Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, and brought together high-ranking members of the CIA and State
Department, as well as Iraqi exile’s from Europe and the United States with expertise in fields
such as oil policy and transitional justice. At the onset of the grandly titled Future of Iraq project,

it became apparent that negotiations between the State and Defense Departments would be
subject to bureaucratic ranglings. The Defense Department war ardently against such an
initiative, fearing that it “would lead to strengthening the hand of the State Department’s
protégés in the struggle for supremacy inside the Iraqi opposition” (Taqi, 2015, p. 141). In turn,
many in the State Department felt disrespected by what they viewed as a failure to seriously
consider their planning efforts. As Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith
highlights, despite the fact that there was an attempt at post-war planning for Iraq, “the teamwork
did not develop… nor were the old divides transcended” (Feith 2008, pg. 277).
These interagency turf wars established a trend that would continue throughout the
occupation of Iraq. Conflict regarding the manner of addressing certain concerns permeated the
entirety of Bush’s administration, with disagreements between Vice President Dick Cheney and
Secretary of State Colin Powell creating significant impediments to the development of a
uniform policy. According to David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud, the “coalition between
Cheney and [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfield was successful in using the bureaucracy to
limit options considered and thereby influence the outcome, all of which was at Powell’s
expense” (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 276). Underlying these disputes however was the far
more concerning reality that the entire process of planning for the post-war era was “mired in
ineptitude, poor organization, and indifference” (Taqi, 2015, p. 144).
According to Professor George Joffe of Cambridge University, who was one of six
experts chosen to advise Prime Minister Tony Blair regarding the invasion, those who were
placed to guide Iraq had little experience in Middle Eastern Affairs. The individuals within
leadership thus had no practical experience on the manner to approach transitioning to
democracy. Indeed, the attitude surrounding those in power implied a certain arrogance and

naivete in the ease of which democracy would sprout in the Middle East. According to Dr. Toby
Dodge, "much of the rhetoric from Washington appeared to depict Saddam's regime as
something separate from Iraqi society, all you had to do was remove him and the 60 bad men
around him.” (Brands, 2012, p. 630). In fact, “little effort was made to understand the political
realities of the region, or the depth of control that Saddam Hussein had had over the rivaling
religious and ethnic groups” (Brigoux, 2014, p. 30). This lethal optimism, combined with the
delayed onset of post-war planning, meant that reconstruction efforts by the United States were
ineffective in addressing the structural problems within Iraqi society.
For example, on January 30th, 2005, the long-awaited vote to elect a national assembly
and write a permanent constitution finally took place. It was lauded by the Bush administration
as evidence that Iraq was making significant strides in order to implement democracy, and
received considerable media attention throughout the west. Yet despite the high voter turnout,
political leaders ordered “urban - slum underclass” Shi’ite and Sunni populations to boycott it in
protest of American influence. As a result, there was a notable imbalance in representation in
both the regional councils and parliament (Hill, 2011, p. 154). The dissatisfaction that developed
due to this grew within the population, and contributed significantly to the civil war that occured
between 2005 and 2007. Furthermore, the United States notably allowed up to two- million Iraqi
born expatriates to vote, in the hopes that it would serve as an advantage to the U.S. appointed
interim Prime Minister Allawi chances of reelection. These efforts proved ineffective and
Allawi’s party came in third place, but it highlights the United States inability to conform to Iraqi
self-determination.
Several fundamental problems needed to be addressed by the time a new government
took place for a stable Iraq. Basic services needed to be restored, infrastructure needed to be

rebuilt, and jobs needed to be established. Violence between varying religious, ethnic, and
regional groups needed to be suppressed, and they needed a unifying force to ensure future
efforts would be prevented. Most importantly, the political culture of violence needed to be
altered. However, the American over-reliance on Neo Political ideology obstructed policymakers
from developing a successful method of effecting these changes. For one, the fixation on the
perception of America as the bulwark of idealized democracy meant that those in power were
unwilling to develop a version of democracy that was cohesive with Iraq’s socio-political
culture. Thus the implementation of a democractice system did not serve as a cohesive system as
Americans anticipated. Instead it was viewed by some political factions in the region as an
invasive and subversive force, an extension of the Western imperialism that had damaged their
country significantly already.
Furthermore, because of the Neopolitical definition of power, the United States acted
under the perception that their authority would serve as a coercive force in enacting conformity
among the population. Indeed, it was this power that had led to the acceptance of democracy in
Japan and Germany. However, those in charge of democratization efforts underestimated the
hold that ethnic divides would have over the country, as well as the strength of anti-American
sentiment throughout the region. They had naively believed that the people of Iraq would
welcome the overthrow of Saddam’s repressive regime, and the “freedom” that democracy
seemingly entailed.
Turkey
Of the six candidate countries for EU succession, none has had as long an association
with the body as Turkey. Its involvement with European integration dates as far back as the
1950s, during a period in which the country sought to enhance cooperation with the EEC.

Indeed, “Turkey considers itself as a part of Europe, and shares with it common principles and
values, and thus its relations with the EU are a strategic aspect of its foreign policy” (Republic of
Turkey, 2013). As a result of this keen interest, it is considered an essential partner on such
issues as security, migration, the economy, and counter-terrorism. The country has even
established itself as a member in certain European institutions, notably the Council of Europe
(African, 2006, p.56). In 1987, Turkey applied to become a member of the EU, but the
application was rejected due to its consistent violations in areas such as human rights and
democracy. Tensions were heightened when in 1997 Turkey was once again not included in
accession negotiations due to its inability to satisfactorily meet the Copenhagen criteria. This was
necessary to begin accession talks, and required that potential states must have,
“Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union.”
It was not until two years after their initial bid that the EU agreed to consider Turkey a
candidate country. The Helsinki Decision of 1999 marked an advancement of Turkish-EU
relations, and “a political avalanche of democratization” (Kubicek, 2011, p. 914). It allowed for
Turkey’s eligibility for the EU, outlining that the process would be initiated once the
Copenhagen criteria were met. By November 2000, the EU issued the Accession Partnership
Document (APD), which outlined measures necessary for implementation in the “short term,”
and the “medium term” (Hale, 2003; p. 108). In response to these orders, the Turkish parliament
passed significant constitutional and legal reforms between 2001-2005, in an era which would be
described as the “golden period of Turkey’s reforming process” (Hale, 2011, p. 107). In

particular, reform was centered on four major points of contention “ first, freedom of expression
and association and of political parties; second, the treatment of ethnic minorities (particularly as
regards cultural rights); third, the abolition of the death penalty; and, fourth, the reduction of the
political role of the military” (Hale, 2003, p. 107). Though addressing these issues did not
resolve all the concerns the EU had, they were the most pressing stipulations required to begin
accession talks.
Fundamental Freedoms
Turkey claims to be a democracy, yet many of the fundamental freedoms associated with
such a system are lacking. While the original text of the Constitution did outline the right to
“freedom of residence and movement,” “freedom of thought and opinion,” “freedom of
communication,” and “the right to disseminate.. thoughts and opinions,” it also included several
provisions which severely impeded the application of these rights. Both Articles 13 and 14
placed constraints on speech which deviated from the national interests of the country. For
example, Article 13 stated that:
“Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the
State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, [and] national
security…” (Turkish Constitution, 2011).
These and further statutes were utilized for years in order inhibit dissent, particularly in relation
to Islamist or Kurdish issues. Penal Code Article 312 for example was utilized to “prosecute such
people on the grounds that calling for greater political or cultural rights for the Kurds, or
adherence to Islamic principles in politics, constitute an incitement to racial or religious hatred.”
(Hale, 2003; pg. 112). The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 made offenses such as public assemblies

and propaganda opposing the current regime punishable by up to 2 to 5 years of imprisonment.
These legal provisions were deemed contrary to human rights, and thus the ADP established a
“short-term” measure whereby Turkey would need to “strengthen legal and constitutional
guarantees for the right to freedom of expression in line with article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights [and to] address in that context the situation of those persons in
prison sentenced for expressing non-violent opinions” (Council of EU, 2003).
As a result of these guidelines, by October 2001 the Turkish government enacted a
package of constitutional amendments. Both Article 13 and 14 were altered “to bring them in
rough correspondence with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on human rights”
(115). Thus Article 14 was amended to include,
“No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that enables the State
or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the
Constitution or to stage an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively than
stated in the Constitution” (Turkish Constitution, 2011).
Further
In 2002, three more packages were adopted. The most extensive was enacted on the 2nd
of August, and “abolished the death penalty in peacetime, revised the Anti-Terror Law, allowed
for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and opened the road for the retrial of all the
cases that the European Court of Human Rights found to be in violation of the European
Convention of Human Rights” (Müftüler Baç, 2005, p. 23). This allowed for greater ease of
freedom of expression, association, and broadcasting and the press (European Commission,
2003, . 72). It was a significant stride in fulfilling the goals outlined in the Copenhagen
Agreement, and its transformative nature was indicative of the urgency with which government

officials were seeking to reform the country. During this period, the accession talks for the
Central and Eastern Europe countries were about to be concluded, and unless Turkey could show
that they had sufficiently adopted measures that fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, the country
would be left out of the Enlargement process. Furthermore, the regime responsible for enacting
these resolutions was the same one that had borne witness to the Helsinki summit, and thus the
members were concerned about the ramifications of failing to meet such goals.
By 2003, a Regular Report from the European Commission found that “over the past year
the Turkish government has shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms…
[and] has taken important steps to ensure their effective implementation” (2004, p. 11). In
November 2002, the Justice and Development Party won the general election and the political
consolidation that came from this led to significant institutional convergence towards European
standards. The notion of “incitement” was addressed, and by 2003 the penalty for criticising
government institutions was removed. Imprisoning individuals based on opinions that were nonviolent was abolished in 2004, and in the same year the Grand National Assembly passed a law
on freedom of association which was considered the most liberal one in 20 years. No longer were
groups required to inform or request permission from government officials to gather, and
security forces could no longer appear on the premises without a warrant. By 2007 it was found
that “the legal framework for freedom of assembly [was] broadly in line with European
standards” (Turkey Progress Report, 2007; pg. 16). Though legal provisions which inhibit the
freedoms of the citizens of the country still persist, the implementation of these amendments
reveals that the influence of the EU led to reforms.
Treatment of Minorities

The establishment of protections for minority groups remains a concern within Turkey.
Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 establishes the right of minorities to “use their
own language, the right of political and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational
and social welfare institutions, and the right to freedom of religion, travel, and migration” (700).
Contention arises, as this establishes rights and liberties for such groups, and thus fulfills the
minority related criteria for EU membership. As a result, while Turkey has willingly passed
numerous treaties and amendments on improving human rights, the government does not find it
necessary to sign the EU’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
However, only non-Muslim communities (Armernians, Greeks, and Jews) are recognized as
minorities, and therefore other ethnic groups are not granted protected status. As a result
communities such as the Alewites, Assyrians, and Kurds are subject to political discrimination.
Moreover, efforts taken to reform Kurdish issues have been viewed as a threat to Turkey’s
national security (Hale, 2003).
Concerns regarding progress in this area were always addressed in European Commission
reports, but beginning in 2003 assessments on minority listings became more expansive and
diversified. This can “be interpreted as an increasing effort on the EU’s part to encourage Turkey
to reconsider its minority regime” (Oran, 2021, p. 707). In response to consistent urgings, in
2001 Turkey produced the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. This document
reaffirms the short and medium term goals outlined by the Accession Partnership, but abstains
from addressing minority rights as a separate issue. Pursuant to this document, Turkey
established three fields of transformation that could be undertaken without modifying the
traditional minority framework: “eliminating discrimation, improving cultural rights, and
improving religious freedom” (Oran, 2021, p. 712).

Reform was thus accomplished in pursuit of these goals. In order to eliminate
discrimination, the Labor Code was amended in 2003 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
religion, race, color, sect, or language. The criminal code adopted in 2004 also included similar
provisions in regards to access to services and education. Efforts were made to remove prejudice
regarding minorities from school textbooks by the Ministry of Education, and religious textbooks
were amended to include concerns related to Christianity. Consideration for improving cultural
rights was included within Turkey’s Accession Partnership Document mainly to address the
issues related to the Kurdish population. It prioritized enhancing the linguistic rights of this
group, and by 2001 the ban on publishing in a non-Turkish language was removed from the
Constitution. Thus the 2002 Constitutional amendments included legalizing the use of minority
languages and dialects in radio and television broadcasting. Significantly, special courses were
introduced to teach Kurdish.
However, despite this progress, there still remains problems which are necessary to
address to remedy EU concerns. In spite of these new regulations, “there is still a gap between de
facto and de jure minority issues,” in exercising these freedoms (Oran, 2021, p. 713). For
example, Kurdish radio channels do exist, but they are often subject to heavy bureaucratic
complications. The duration of broadcasts are strictly limited, occurring no more than forty-five
minutes a day, and no more than four days a week. Furthermore, the government has yet to
designate Kurds as a minority group, nor does it appear that it has the intention to do so in the
coming years. This treatment is symptomatic of Kamalist nationalism which prevails throughout
the country. Through this lens, expanding cultural rights too greatly could lead to these
communities garnering sufficient autonomy to separate from Turkey. Thus despite the desire to
appease the EU, Turkey maintains a restrictive approach to this issue.

One of the most important issues regarding Turkey’s membership negotiation is that of
religious freedom. The constitutional amendments enacted in 2002 have led to some
improvement in this sphere, notably that non-Muslim foundations were allowed to acquire and
register property. This meant that new places of worship could be established. Furthermore,
religious courses were expanded to include teachings about faiths other than Islam. However,
secularism is enshrined within the constitution, and concern remains within the country that
improving religious freedom could lead to the growth of fundamentalism (Prodromou, 2010).
Thus despite the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, religious communities still face persistent
structural obstacles. For example, in 2004 the Turkish National Security Council suspended the
opening of the Halki School of Theology over concerns that the Greek Orthodox minority
“constituted a potential security threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state”
(Prodromou, 2010; p. 19).
Thus while Turkey has been amenable to adapting to EU demands, it has consistently
shown resistance in altering its traditional approach to minority groups. The selective adaptation
of EU policy in the form of the Turkish National Program has been inadequate in moving the
country towards “full compliance with modern international standards and treatments of
minorities” (Turkey Progress Report, 2004; pg. 48).
The Abolition of the Death Penalty
The abolition of the death penalty is not only an explicit stipulation of the EU, but is also
used internationally as an indicator of development by the United Nations. As William Schabas
asserts, it is “generally considered to be an important element in democratic development for
States breaking with a past characterized by… injustice” (2002; p. 10). The EU had consistently
called for Turkey to align itself with this policy, which was mandated by Protocol No.6 of the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). The constitutional
amendment of 2001 restricted the use of the death penalty to crimes “committed in cases of war,
or the imminent threat of war and terror crimes,” or in certain cases of “felonies against the state”
(Ozbudun, 2007, p. 189). This meant that the death penalty was restricted in times of peace. In
August 2002, the third reform package was passed and the terror crime exception was
eliminated. Finally, by 2003 the Parliament voted to abolish the death penalty fully, which was
then formalized by the 2004 constitutional amendment (Turkish Report, 2004).
As a result of these reforms, Turkey has achieved the standards established by the EU in
regards to the death penalty and signed the ECHR. According to Ian Manners, the “EU has
played an important external role in bringing pressure to bear on [this] country” (2002, p. 50).
Thus it can be asserted that the EU has been effective in instituting sufficient reform in this
sphere.
The Military Influence on Political Life
One major obstacle to EU accession was the issue of the military influence on Turkish
political life. Criticisms have primarily focused on the lack of accountability to either civilian or
parliamentary oversight. During the last century, the military has consolidated greater authority
through four military coups: 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 . In addition to this, the legitimacy of
its autonomy was further reinforced by the fact that it is seen as a protector of Kamalist
nationalism and Turkish Identity. This role would need to be diminished if Turkey were to be
accepted as a member of the EU.
The European Commission had consistently criticized the National Security Council
(NSC) in its yearly reports as an undemocratic mechanism 445. Chaired by the President, the
council’s agenda relates to any matter that may be perceived as a threat to national security. Thus

while the Constitution delineates it as a consultative organ, its decisions have often been given
priority by the Councils of Ministers. Despite the critique levied against it by the EU, the NSC
was a vocal advocate of European integration since the 1990s. This was because it was in
accordance with Kemalist ideology, which praised modernization and Westernization. According
to former Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoˇglu, “the armed forces do not even discuss
the issue of whether Turkey should enter the EU or not… the membership of the EU will assure
so many benefits for Turkey” (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p. 455). The NSC however has
been adamant that two “untouchable republican principles” remain strictly within its purview:
that of secularism and unity. Thus it has intervened on reform related to the Kurdish issue and
cultural rights, both of which are EU priorities.
Despite its adamant commitment to maintain certain principles, the military has been
willing to acquiesce on modifying “its strategies and policies to interact more with civilians, to
be as transparent as possible, and to not impede democratic consolidation” (452). Beginning in
2001, a number of reforms were passed in pursuit of this. Article 118 was amended to increase
the number of civilian representatives of the NSC from five to nine, while sustaining the number
of military members at five. It further underscored that the role of the body would be advisory,
and that its judgement would no longer be given priority consideration. The seventh reform
package introduced in 2003 amended the Law on the National Security Council, which
fundamentally changed the composition and the duties of the NSC. Notably, “the transparency of
defense expenditures was enhanced,” “the post of Security General [was] no longer reserved for
military personnel,” and “unlimited access… to any civilian agency [was] aborgated” (Güney
and Karatekelioğlu, 2005456).

Another concern was the competence of military courts to try civilians, which were
continuously utilized to limit freedom of expression. Consequently pressure from the EU led to
the introduction of training courses to increase the competency of military judges in 2003. By
2006, the “eight harmonization package enforced the removal of Article 11 of the law on the
Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts to prosecute civilians” (Mohammed,
2015, p.55). The military has shown marked willingness to amend the scope of its power in order
to “turn to the west. Accordingly, in 2010 a report by the European Commission found that these
reforms had been efficient in aligning Turkey with EU standards in this sphere.
Conclusion
As seen from the preceding analysis, since the 1999 Helsinki Conference Turkey has
consistently implemented new laws and passed various reform packages in the pursuit of
meeting the goals outlined by the APD. In the pursuit of democratic stabilization, the EU has
utilized the Copenhagen Criteria, the conditionality principle, and its enlargement policy in order
to exert pressure on the country. Notably, since the areas that the EU has regularly identified as
major political concerns have coincided with the priority reforms Turkey has implemented, it can
be logically concluded that the EU has served as a motivating influence on these efforts.
Significant progress has been made as a result of these efforts, specifically in expanding
fundamental freedoms, abolishing the death penalty, restricting military influence, and
protecting minorities rights.

CONCLUSION
In the years following the Cold War, both the United States and the European Union
developed unique conceptualizations of their roles as democracy promoters. The United States
viewed itself as a unilateral authority, fueled by a Neoconservatism idealism which underscored
its presence in Iraq. However, its reliance on this school of thought had an adverse effect on its
efforts. It failed to institute the necessary reforms to remedy the institutional failings of the
country, and was unwilling to amend its behavior to appeal to the socio-political culture of the
country. Its reliance on hard powers further alienated it from acceptance from the Iraqi populace,
who instead saw their influence as invasive.
In comparison, the European Union’s approach to reform was significantly more
successful within Turkey, where its presence served as a catalyst for a series of constitutional
amendments. Through the utilization of norm diffusion, EU standards were willingly adopted in
a desire to gain greater access to the benefits of membership to the body promised. Thus in
pursuit of cohesion, the European Union’s approach was more advantageous. Despite this
progress, Turkey has still failed to garner full acceptance into the European Union. In recent
years it has failed to successfully meet the standards outlined by Copenhagen agreement, and its
accession is on an indefinite hold. The ability to successfully implement a fully democratic

system in this country can be found in the EU’s inconsistency in its approach to its normative
policy. Nevertheless, the EU’s strategic and economic interests have also constituted vital
triggers for the EU’s enlargement policy. Furthermore, the EU containment policy towards
Turkey has lessened the effectiveness and credibility of its normative approach in influencing
political developments in Turkey, and the EU could have exerted more pressure and used
more effective measures in order to produce a better outcome with respect to the Turkish
reform process.
Through the analysis of these cases, it can be asserted that democratic promotion can be a
successful instrument in the promotion of peace. However, the theoretical approach taken by the
transformative power plays a significant role in whether such a system will be accepted. Reform
will be most effective if it is adopted willingly by the institutional authorities of a transitional
country. The NPE model is most conducive to this, though in order for its potential to be fully
realized the EU must commit to a uniform approach in all applicant countries. Furthermore,
progress in this realm will not be an immediate effect of implementing new policies. Rebuilding
countries which have often been victims of oppressive regimes and inadequate modernization
will not be easily accomplished. However, the benefit that such transformations could have on a
global level is worthy of pursuing.
Several factors impeded the progress of the development of a fully comprehensive
analysis. One was the different socio-political factors that existed within each country. In
comparison to Iraq, Turkey’s constitution had already gone through a process of democratization
within the 1920s. It therefore was adaptable to reform by the European Union. Further, the ties
between Turkey and the European Union were significantly stronger than the ties between Iraq
and the United States. As discussed, Turkey was a willing recipient of the European Union’s

influence, thus acquiesced to adopting measures of democracy to a degree that Iraq did not. In
order to move forward, more analysis will need to be dedicated to other instances of
democratization efforts by both powers. Increasing the number of case studies in further research
will create the opportunity to determine factors which assist in democracy promotion, and factors
that inhibit it. Another concern is the time period. The rise of democratization has been a recent
development, and as such the period in order to study its effects has been narrow. Thus,
consistent attention will need to be devoted to how these transitional countries develop in the
next few decades.

WORKS CITED
research.lancs.ac.uk. N.p., Web. 17 Apr. 2021.
<http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/services/downloadRegister/229120049/2018gers
onphd.pdf>.
Müftüler Baç, Meltem. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European
Union.” South European society & politics 10, no. 1 (2005): 17–31.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. "Two Faces of Power." The American political science
review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947-952.
Beetham, David. Democracy and Human Rights / David Beetham. Library Catalogue, 1999.

Bickerton, C.J, and R.G Whitman. “Legitimacy through Norms: The Political Limits to
Europe’s Normative Power.” In Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical
Perspectives, 25–43.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

BRANDS, HAL, and DAVID PALKKI. ""Conspiring Bastards": Saddam Hussein's Strategic View of the
United States." Diplomatic History 36, no. 3 (2012): 625-59. Accessed August 6, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44376191.

Bridouz, J. and Kurki, M. (2014) Democracy Promotion-A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge)

Burnell, Peter. “Political Strategies of External Support for Democratization,” Foreign Policy
Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, November 2005, Pages 361–
384, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.00016.x

Bush, George. “ Decision Points / George W. Bush. 1st ed. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.

resident Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East.” National Archives and Records
Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, 6 Nov. 2003,
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.
Caraley, Demetrios James. American Hegemony : Preventive War, Iraq, and Imposing
Democracy / Edited by Demetrios James Caraley. Library Catalogue, 2004.

Castells, M. The Information Age: Economy Society and Culture. Vol I: The Rise of the Network
Society, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing , 2000a.

Dagron, Alfonso. 2006. Communication for social change: anthology: historical and contemporary readings . South Orange,
NJ: Communication for Social Change Consortium.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1984. Modern Political Analysis. 4th ed. Prentice-Hall Foundations of
Modern Political Science Series. Prentice-Hall.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.02861574
6&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Dusza, Karl. "Max Weber's Conception of the State." International Journal of Politics, Culture,
and Society 3, no. 1 (1989): 71-105. Accessed August 6, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20006938.
Ergun Özbudun (2007) Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004, Turkish
Studies, 8:2, 179-196, DOI: 10.1080/14683840701312195

Feith, Douglass. “Why We Went to War in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2003
Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3-18. Accessed
August 6, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184.

Giddens, Anthony. The consequences of modernity. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
Güney, Aylin, and Petek Karatekelioğlu. “Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations:
Challenges and Prospects.” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 3 (April 2005): 439–
62. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0503100306.

Horowitz, Donald L. "The challenge of ethnic conflict: democracy in divided societies." Journal
of democracy 4, no. 4 (1993): 18-38.
Hale, William. “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession
Process.” Turkish studies 4, no. 1 (2003): 107–126.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
The Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series. London: University of Oklahoma Press.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=15342&site=edslive&scope=site.

Huntington, Samuel P. 2009. “How Countries Democratize.” Political Science Quarterly 124 (1):
31.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsggo&AN=edsgcl.198931211&site=
eds-live&scope=site.
Hardwick, Daniel. “Is the EU a Normative Power?” E, 3 Sept. 2011, www.e-ir.info/2011/09/03/isthe-eu-a-normative-power/.
Hayes, Stephen F. Cheney : the Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial
Vice President 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Hill, Matthew Alan. Democracy Promotion and Conflict-Based Reconstruction: The United
States & Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan & Iraq. Vol. 18. Florence:
Routledge, 2011.

Holzhacker, Ronald, and Marek Neuman. “Framing the Debate: The Evolution of the
European Union as an External Democratization Actor.” In Democracy Promotion and the
Normative Power Europe Framework, 13–36. Cham: Springer International Publishing,
2018

European Communities. “Declaration on European Identity.” Copenhagen, 14 December 1973

Kaldor, M. and I. Vejvoda (1997) ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries’,
International Affairs, 73, 1.

Kirkus Reviews. 2021. “Fukuyama, Francis: AFTER THE END OF HISTORY,” March 15.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsglr&AN=edsglr.A654727548&site=
eds-live&scope=site.

Krauthammer, C. "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World ." American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research . February 10, 2004.
http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=19912

Krauthammer, Charles. “The Poverty of Realism.” New Republic, 1986.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The unipolar moment." Foreign Aff. 70 (1990): 23.

Kristol, Irving. "American conservatism 1945-1995." Public Interest 121 (1995): 80.

Kristol, Irving. Neoconservatism: the autobiography of an idea. Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Kubicek, Paul. “Political Conditionality and European Union’s Cultivation of Democracy in
Turkey.” Democratization 18, no. 4 (2011): 910–931.

Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States.” Foreign Affairs, 28 Jan. 2009,
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1994-03-01/confronting-backlash-states.
Lindsay Lloyd. 2010. “European Approaches to Democracy Promotion.” International Journal 65 (3):
547–59.

https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.25762017&site=eds
-live&scope=site.

Little, Dan. Lukes on Power, 14 Oct. 2010, understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2010/10/lukes-onpower.html.

Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: a Radical View. London: Macmillan.
MANN MICHAEL. 1984. “The Autonomous Power of the State : Its Origins, Mechanisms and
Results.” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches
Archiv Für Soziologie 25 (2): 185–213.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.23999270&site=eds
-live&scope=site.
Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of common market
studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–258.

Manners, Ian. “The European Union's Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the
Critical.” Palgrave Macmillan (2011).

Mello, Patrick A., Democratic Peace Theory (September 25, 2014). The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social
Science Perspectives, edited by Paul I. Joseph, Thousand Oaks: Sage, Forthcoming, Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674255

Mitchell, David, and Tansa George Massoud. “Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-Making
Process and the Iraq War.” Foreign policy analysis 5, no. 3 (2009): 265–286.

Mohammed, Anwaar. “The Decline of the Military’s Political Influence in Turkey”, 2015.

Munro, André. "State monopoly on violence". Encyclopedia Britannica, 6 Mar. 2013,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence.

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." Foreign policy 80 (1990): 153-171.

Oran, Baskın. Minorities and Minority Rights in Turkey: From the Ottoman Empire to the Present
State. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2021.

Özbudun, Ergun. “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004.” Turkish studies 8, no. 2
(2007): 179–196.

Parsons, Talcott. The structure of social action. Vol. 491. New York: Free press, 1949.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Italy, Europe: Stanford
university press.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.E1E53C8D&site=
eds-live&scope=site.
Popitz, Heinrich, Andreas Göttlich, Jochen Dreher, and Gianfranco Poggi. 2017. Phenomena of Power :
Authority, Domination, and Violence. European Perspectives : A Series in Social Thought and
Cultural Criticism. Columbia University Press.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.035130453&site=
eds-live&scope=site.

Prodromou, Elizabeth H. “TURKEY BETWEEN SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM?: THE
‘MUSLIMHOOD MODEL’ AND THE GREEK ORTHODOX MINORITY.” The Brandywine
review of faith & international affairs 3, no. 1 (2005): 11–22.

Samatar, Abdi Ismail, and Ahmed I. Samatar. 2002. The African State : Reconsiderations. Heinemann.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.020055798&site
=eds-live&scope=site.
Samatar, Abdi Ismail. 1992. “Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal
Convention.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30 (4): 625–41.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.161268&site=edslive&scope=site.
Stradiotto, Gary A. "DEMOCRATIZING IRAQ: REGIME TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE." International Journal on World Peace 21, no. 2 (2004): 3-36.
Accessed August 6, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753438.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The Process of Enlargement : Problems, Interests, Norms”. London:
Routledge, 2006.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1975. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3d ed. Harper Colophon Books:
CN 456. Harper & Row.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.023630576&site
=eds-live&scope=site.

Simpson, Sid. 2019. “Making Liberal Use of Kant? Democratic Peace Theory and Perpetual Peace.”
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33 (1): 109–28. doi:10.1177/0047117818811463.
Smith, K. "The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations ." The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, vol.9, no.2, 2003: 103-113.

Stalder, Felix. 2006. Manuel Castells : The Theory of the Network Society. Key Contemporary Thinkers.
Polity.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.025550733&site
=eds-live&scope=site.
Taqi, Abess. “The United States and Democracy Promotion in Iraq and Lebanon in the Aftermath
of the Events of 9/11 the 2003 Iraq War and .” University of London, 2015.
Tilly, Charles. “Social Movements, 1768-2018.” CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries,
June 1, 2020.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsglr&AN=edsglr.A626121621&site=
eds-live&scope=site.
The Turkish Constitution. New York: Turkish Information Office, 2011.

Turkey 2001 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2001.

Turkey 2002 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2002.

Turkey 2003 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2003.

Turkey 2004 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2004.

Turkey 2007 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2007.

Turkey 2009 Progress Report: EU Enlargement October 2009. Brussels: European Commission,
2009.

WARLOUZET, Laurent, Paolo Chiocchetti and Frédéric Allemand (eds.), Competitiveness and
Solidarity in the European Union. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Londres, Routledge, and 2019 ;
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02915647 ; Paolo Chiocchetti and Frédéric Allemand (eds.).
2019. Competitiveness and Solidarity in the History of the European Union (1957-2017). France,
Europe: HAL CCSD.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.9C58A2C&site=e
ds-live&scope=site.
Weber, Max. 1946. “Politics as a Vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press.

Wolfers, Arnold. “Essays on International Politics.” The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 67–80.,
doi:10.2307/1952839.
Youhana, Michael. “Ending the War on Weapon States.” Fellow Travelers, 30 Oct. 2018,
fellowtravelersblog.com/2018/08/09/ending-the-war-on-weapon-states/.

